This note responds to a recent post on Jefferson Morley’s JFK Facts blog from JFK researcher Malcolm Blunt. In his post, Blunt suggests that Representative Luna should go after documents in the “operational file” for CIA officer George Joannides, as opposed to documents in Joannides’ “personnel file”, such as the ones recently released.
I believe this is a “categorical” error. CIA keeps records on operations (or projects) based on the names and subjects of the operations. It does not chop up the details of operations and compile them into files for each CIA employee involved. There is thus no such thing as an “operational file” for Joannides, or indeed for any CIA officer.
Blunt on Morley
Blunt’s post on the Morley blog appears here. Blunt is a well-known JFK researcher, with extensive knowledge of JFK documents. As I have mentioned elsewhere, he has a large collection of ARC records which he has generously made available online through his Google Drive archive. It’s a great resource, and I have used it many times.
In his note, Blunt is supportive of Morley’s reading of the Joannides personnel docs and critical of Morley’s critics. My own view is of course the opposite.
Here, however, I will disagree not with his view of the Joannides docs, but with his claims about the files available on Joannides. In particular, I disagree with his claim that CIA officers have “operational files”, in addition to personnel files.
I also disagree with his view of “Operation TILT”, AKA the “Bayo Pawley affair”, and with his description of the CIA-ARRB handling of the “Operation TILT” file.
The Bayo-Pawley affair, aka “Operation TILT”
I’ll start with what Blunt calls the Bayo-Pawley mission. The CIA cryptonym for this operation was “TILT”. It is also sometimes referred to as “Operation Red Cross.”
Pawley was William Pawley, an American industrialist, and diplomat at various times in his career, who worked closely with CIA’s Miami station on anti-Castro activities after the fall of the Batista regime in Cuba.
Sometime in April 1963, Pawley was told that four Soviet military officers in Cuba had defected and were in the hands of anti-Castro Cubans inside Cuba. The Soviets supposedly told the Cuban resistance that there were still Soviet missiles in Cuba, in violation of the agreement Kennedy and Khrushchev had reached to end the Cuban missile crisis.
The people making this claim told Pawley they needed his help to extract the defectors from Cuba and bring them to the United States, where they would be free to expose Soviet perfidy.
Pawley approached Ted Shackley, Chief of the Miami CIA station, for his views on exfiltrating the supposed defectors. Making a long story short, Shackley told Pawley that the scheme was dubious, but agreed to provide CIA support for the operation in exchange for turning the defectors over to CIA for debriefing.
The operation grew in size from the initial contact with Pawley, until it even included a LIFE photographer to document the defectors’ escape. In the meantime, CIA grew more and more dubious as they learned more about the people behind the operation.
It was only a few days before the launch of TILT that CIA learned Eduardo Perez, AKA “Bayo”, was the main Cuban involved in the operation. CIA regarded its previous involvement with Perez as a “fiasco”, and warned Pawley that he was an “unsavory type”.
Despite the hazards, Pawley was willing to go on with the mission, and despite its doubts, CIA chose to provide support for Pawley’s run to Cuba. In the end, no defectors ever appeared. The anti-Castro Cubans involved in the exfiltration landed on the Cuban mainland with several hundred pounds of weapons and were not seen again.
Blunt’s description of TILT gets an important detail wrong: he writes that the operation was an attempt to “capture Russian military advisers,” not to pick up willing defectors. He writes this even though the source he links to, John Simkins’ “Educational Forum,” clearly states that they were supposed to pick up defectors.
Perhaps “capture” was a slip of Blunt’s pen. If the U.S. government had learned that the Cubans intended to go out and kidnap Russian army officers, they would certainly have taken drastic measures to put a stop to the plot, and CIA would never have gotten involved.
Files on Operation TILT in the ARC
HSCA was well aware of Operation TILT through articles and books of varying accuracy, and early in their investigation, they requested CIA records on William Pawley. As a result, the HSCA-CIA segregated collection includes Pawley’s 201 file (three volumes, starting here) and two copies of the TILT file (here and here).1The first version, which I have gone through page by page, comes from box 6 folder 12 of the hard copy HSCA-CIA segregated collection. The second copy comes from box 51, folder 25 of the hard-copy HSCA-CIA segregated collection. It seems almost identical to the first, but I have not gone over it page by page; there’s only so much repetition I can take.
There is also a third, distinct version of the TILT file in the ARC. This was added by the ARRB, which went back and requested copies of many original CIA records. In this case, I suspect that the ARRB requested another copy of the TILT file because the HSCA copies are both sanitized, with the names of CIA employees and certain other details redacted. The ARRB copy is unredacted.
The ARRB copy is available as individual records.2They appear between record numbers 104-10312-10171 and 104-10312-10380. The box/folder location is JFK miscellaneous records, box 8 folder 2. Altogether, the file totals 136 records and 246 pages. Despite the fact that it is not online as a single file, the lack of redactions make it the preferred version for reading. Many of the cables in the file are carbon copies, however, so readers may have to refer to the HSCA copy when the carbons are unclear.
CIA and ARRB handling of the “Operation Tilt” file
When the CIA began declassifying the HSCA-CIA Segregated Collection in 1993, there was strong disagreement between the Division of Operations (DO), which held Pawley’s files, and the Historical Review Group (HRG), which was charged with declassifying the Segregated Collection.
The DO wanted Pawley’s files withheld in full, while the HRG argued that the story of Pawley’s connection to the CIA had already been effectively released in the open press, and that furthermore the language of the JFK Act clearly extended to CIA files on Pawley.
The question was finally resolved in HRG’s favor. For readers interested in the details, there is a collection of memos going back and forth between the two offices available here.
It is worth noting that this argument was internal to the CIA. The ARRB did not get running until late 1994. ARRB eventually developed a strong interest in material on Pawley, and submitted their Informal Request 37 to the CIA for additional records.3 See ARC 104-10336-10036. The ARRB memo on the second copy of the Operation TILT file is available here.
Problems in Blunt’s account
Blunt’s account of ARRB’s handling of Pawley’s files is off on a number of details. First, he writes that the ARRB “learned that Pawley’s 201 file had been deposited in the operational files relating to the Bayo-Pawley mission. The CIA also discovered some operational records in Pawley’s 201 file.”
According to Blunt, “A sensible agreement was reached by both parties that the Bayo-Pawley operational file could be released under what is known as EHU (Enhanced Historical Understanding). The agency made it clear to the ARRB that this decision was very much a “one off” and should be regarded as exceptional and not standard.”
Blunt then describes how “operational activities” were authorized in the CIA, and how records of these activities were later stored. Blunt writes that “operational files of CIA are exempt from external examination by congressional order,” but that “possibly” they may be reviewed by “members of the House who have the necessary clearances.”
This, in Blunt’s view, gives Representative Anna Luna, chair of the House Sub-Committee holding hearings on the JFK files, an opportunity to seek out “operational files.”
Blunt is wrong that the 201 file was mixed in with operational files. In the CIA declaration to the ARRB, the Agency spells out the information it supplied to the ARRB on Pawley:
“The Agency’s 201 file on Pawley consists of three volumes, the same as in the JFK sequestered collection, and November 1962 is the date of the last record indexed to his 201. However, the Agency holds operational files for the period 1963 to 1965 which related to Pawley. Those files were made available for review by the ARRB staff and they selected a number of documents for inclusion in the materials being processed for release to NARA.”
Thus, Pawley’s 201 file went up only to 1962. However, there was further information re Pawley’s activities in 1963, which CIA provided from operational files.
In the ARRB memo I cited above, ARRB staffer Michelle Combs gives a similar account of how the Board processed Pawley’s 201 files:
“In response to the Review Board’s Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-31, the Review Board staff examined the 201 file for William Pawley which is located in the CIA sequestered collection. This three-volume file is labeled 1958-1962 and will be processed as part of the sequestered collection.”
In addition, Combs writes:
“Information on Pawley from 1963 was located by the CIA in an operational file on the Bayo-Pawley incident which was designated an assassination record and will be processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. Most of the documents in the Bayo-Pawley file are duplicated in the CIA’s sequestered collection.”
Summarizing, contrary to what Blunt wrote, the TILT file was never considered to be outside the net Congress cast with the JFK Act. The CIA recognized from the beginning that it must be included in the ARC, despite the objections of the DO. The ARRB took the same position; it demanded and received Pawley’s records as required by the JFK Act. It did not resort to special pleading vis-a-vis “Extending Historical Understanding,” and there is no reference in ARRB records to a “one off” arrangement for them.
More generally, Blunt confuses FOIA requirements and limits with the far stricter requirements of the JFK Act. Under the Act, if a record is assassination related, the CIA is required to release it. Thus Blunt is quite wrong when he says that the inclusion of the TILT file was an exception. The ARC is packed full of operational files; from Cuba ops to Mexico City Station projects, large chunks of these records are operational. Despite being operational, they are open in full to the public, due to the JFK Act.
No “operational files” for CIA officers
The distinction between agent, asset, or employee files and operational files is clear. Pawley’s 201 file was not mixed up with operational files, and the TILT file was clearly defined as an operational file, distinct from Pawley’s 201.
Pawley was not a paid CIA employee, however, so his situation is certainly not the same as Joannides’. Ross Crozier, who was the DRE case officer for over a year, is perhaps a better example. Crozier had numerous files, including a 201 file, a personnel file, a security file, a clearance file, a cover file, and so on.
Crozier’s activities with the DRE are mentioned in passing in these files, but the majority of his work with the DRE is not recorded in any of them. Instead, it is recorded in the operational files for the DRE. This is clear evidence that operational files for the specific group we are interested in, the DRE, were NOT kept in officer related or personnel related files. They were kept in separate project or operation files.
The DRE operational records are at the core of Morley’s claims about Joannides. According to the CIA, these files were released in full. Regardless of whether the files are complete, We have copies of what the CIA released. The files consist of almost 1500 pages in a dozen folders, plus files from the Office of Security and the Domestic Contacts Division for the DRE, and 201 files for DRE leaders. The last redactions from these files were removed in 2025, so what we have is open in full.
If one looks further, there are also many references to the DRE in other files on Cuban groups, particularly the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which received the largest CIA subsidies of all the anti-Castro Cuban groups. Where does one look for the records on the CRC? In their operational files, which take up a large chunk of the microfilm records in the HSCA-CIA segregated collection.
This brings me to a second major problem with Blunt’s post. In addition to suggesting that there is an “operational file” for Joannides (there is not), he ignores the actual operational files for the DRE, which DO exist, all 1500 pages. Morley is aware of these files. His complaint is that the operational files as released are not complete. What are they missing? They are missing monthly reports from the period when Joannides was the DRE case officer.
Ross Crozier, DRE case officer prior to Joannides, compiled monthly reports on DRE activities which were sent by dispatch to CIA HQ. Yet there are no monthly reports in the DRE operational files covering the period when George Joannides was their case officer.
Note that there are two folders in the DRE operational files which cover 1963, the year Joannides was DRE case officer, so this period is by no means a complete blank to us.
But Morley believes that Joannides, or someone, continued to compile DRE reports, and that these reports contained information omitted or cut out of the operational file. These “missing” reports still exist in some hidden CIA archive. This was the main idea behind Morley’s FOIA suit against the CIA.
Morley believes these “missing” reports contain details of Lee Oswald’s interactions with CIA personnel, details which would substantiate his claim that CIA was somehow using Oswald.
CIA has repeatedly claimed, both in court and out, to the ARRB and to Morley, that they have made due diligence efforts to find “missing reports”, but have found none. This is where the situation still stands. The documents recently released from Joannides’ personnel file, which Morley has spent a huge amount of time on, contain NO information about DRE operations.
Ignoring the actual DRE operational files, Blunt now suggests that there is a Joannides “operational file”, withheld from the HSCA for who knows what reason, withheld from the ARRB due to FOIA regulations (!), and withheld from Morley despite his FOIA lawsuit. Perhaps CIA has just been waiting for Representative Luna to ask for copies of these hitherto undisclosed records.
Will the CIA cough up “hidden” docs after receiving Representative Luna’s letter? I have consulted my magic eight ball. The answer: OUTLOOK NOT SO GOOD.